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WATER RIGHTS: ENFORCING THE FEDERAL-INDIAN
TRUST AFTER NEVADA V. UNITED STATES
Roger Florio*
Indian Reserved Water Rights and the Trust Relationship
Throughout the United States, competition is rapidly escalating
for a critical and often wasted resource-water. Once considered
plentiful, today water looms as the resource crisis of the future.'
Water disputes have increasingly spawned lengthy and complex
litigation, especially in the arid states of the West and
Southwest. 2 Indian tribes have recently joined these water battles
in an effort to assert their own federally reserved water rights
claims.' These claims stem from a 1908 Supreme Court ruling
that entitled Indian reservations to a reserved water right suffi-
cient to fulfill the irrigation purposes of the reservation.' This
concept, known as the Winters doctrine, established the Indians'
water rights as superior to nearly all other claimants under the
western system of prior appropriation.'
The doctrine of prior appropriation encouraged development
in the water-scarce West by assuring water users of a stable
water supply.6 Most Indian reserved rights have yet to be quanti-
* First-place Winner, 1985 American Indian Law Review Writing Competition.
1. Sheets, War Over Water, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Oct. 31, 1983, at 57.
2. The phenomenon of increasing western water conflict, especially over Indian
rights, is explored in more detail in Riley, The Water Wars, 7 NAT. L.J., Feb. 18, 1985, at
1, col. 1.
3. The Indians' increasing assertiveness in bringing broad water rights claims is
prompting emotional debate in an already contentious field. "Without water rights,"
argues one Indian attorney in the Southwest, "Indians will be unable to [participate in the
economy] and be doomed to desolation, unemployment, and everything else that comes
with poverty. So we're talking about the Indians' very existence and survival." War Over
Water, supra note 1, at 60. The prospect that broad awards to Indians could displace
other western water users has led to an acrimonious litigation atmosphere that one com-
mentator compared to a Civil War battlefield. Riley, supra note 2, at 1.
4. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908), discussed infra at notes 35-43
and accompanying text.
5. Under the doctrine of prior appropriation, an appropriative water right is ac-
quired by diverting water and applying it to a beneficial use. The first person who ap-
propriates water gains a right that is legally superior to the rights of subsequent appro-
priators. The quantity of the right is measured by the amount diverted and put to
beneficial use. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 555 (1963). The riparian doctrine
used in the eastern states gives all the landowners adjoining a body of water a right to
share in its use, so long as they do not unreasonably interfere with one another. Riley,
supra note 2, at 49, col. 1.
6. Riley, supra note 2, at 49, col. 1. By encouraging rapid consumption of water in
an already arid region, the doctrine "just flat out ignored any environmental values." Id.
79
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fied,7 in part because there are many unsettled issues as to the
method of quantification.' Thus, Indian water claims have upset
the certainty and stability that the prior appropriation doctrine
sought to provide.' The rights claimed by Indians often conflict
with already established agricultural, industrial, and residential
water uses, casting a shadow over future economic develop-
ment.'" It is against this background that the Supreme Court
decided Nevada v. United States,"I a claim by the Pyramid Lake
Paiute Tribe for enlargement of its reserved water right, which
it had asserted was not sufficient to fulfill the purposes of the
Pyramid Lake Reservation.' 2 Although implicitly conceding that
the tribe's water appropriation was indeed inadequate, 3 the
This consumptive philosophy, however, faces growing challenges, as illustrated by a re-
cent California Supreme Court case that imposed a doctrine of public trust, senior to
preexisting appropriative rights, to protect the environmental values of water courses. See
National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr.
346 (1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983). The decision in Superior Court mandated
consideration of the public trust in all water rights decisions. The Superior Court plaintiff
brought the suit to challenge appropriation by the city of Los Angeles from a number of
streams feeding into Mono Lake in California. These diversions have caused the level of
the lake to drop, which in turn has imperiled the lake's scenic beauty and ecological
value. See generally Note, Protecting the People's Waters: The California Supreme Court
Recognizes Two Remedies to Safeguard Public Trust Interests in Water, 59 WASH. L.
REV. 357 (1983). The potential application of this decision to Pyramid Lake is obvious; a
thorough discussion, however, is beyond the scope of this note.
7. U.S. G.A.O., RESERVED WATER RIGHTS FOR FEDERAL AND INDIAN RESERVATIONS:
A GROWING CONTROVERSY IN NEED OF RESOLUTION [hereinafter cited as G.A.O. REPORT],
CED 78-176, Nov. 16, 1978. See infra note 130.
8. See generally Note, Indian Reserved Water Rights: The Winters of our Discon-
tent, 88 YALE L.J. 1689 (1979).
9. Riley, supra note 2, at 49, col. 2.
10. Discussing the impact of unquantified Indian reserved rights upon the West, one
commentator stated that the resultant uncertainty impairs planning for both state and
federal water projects, creates problems for enforcement and administration of interstate
water compacts, threatens non-Indian investment due to potential displacement of water
rights, and also slows economic development on the reservation. Note, supra note 8, at
1692-94.
11. 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
12. Id. at 118-19.
13. The Ninth Circuit noted that under the 1944 decree in Orr Ditch, most of the
Truckee River's water is diverted before it reaches Pyramid Lake. The government did
not claim any water for fishery purposes, and the tribe's award was "limited to a small
quantity of irrigation water." United States v. Truckee-Carson, 649 F.2d 1286, 1289 (9th
Cir. 1981). Although the reservation was thought to contain about 20,000 irrigable acres,
id. at 1290, under the Orr Ditch decree the tribe is only allotted enough water to irrigate
about 5,875 acres. Id. at 1294. In his opinion for the Supreme Court, Justice Rehnquist
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol13/iss1/4
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Court focused on the fact that their reserved right had been fixed
through an earlier court decree,"' and unanimously held that ad-
justment of the tribe's allotment was barred by res judicata.1s
The Pyramid Lake Reservation was set aside for the Paiute In-
dians of Nevada in 1859.6 It encompasses Pyramid Lake and the
lower reaches of the Truckee River," the flow of which was the
subject of this litigation. Owing to heavy utilization of the
Truckee by various off-reservation interests," the waters of
Pyramid Lake had been gradually receding. As a result, the lake's
fishery, relied upon by the tribe as a primary source of income,
has been threatened.' 9 In 1973 the government, joined by the
tribe, sued to increase the allotment of water in order to maintain
the level of Pyramid Lake and thereby preserve the tribe's
fishery. 20 The United States District Court for the District of
Nevada held for the defendants, citing the preclusive effect of a
1944 decree known as the Orr Ditch decree, which fixed the quan-
tity of the Paiutes' reserved right.2 ' The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that
the prior decree was res judicata as to all of the parties except for
the Truckee-Carson Irrigation District and the tribe. 22 Because
makes only oblique reference to the inadequacy of the government's representation of the
tribes. Nevada, 463 U.S. at 119 n.7.
14. Nevada, 463 U.S. at 143.
15. Id.
16. A 322,000-acre tract of land, including Pyramid Lake, the lands surrounding it,
and the lower reaches of the Truckee River, was set aside for the Paiute Indians in 1859.
President Ulysses S. Grant confirmed the withdrawal by executive order in 1874, creating
the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation. Id. at 115.
17. When first viewed by non-Indians in 1844, Pyramid Lake was about fifty miles
long and twelve miles wide. The lake is the only habitat for a large species of cut-throat
trout and the cui-ui, which the Indians traded with the earlier settlers. Since that time the
surface area of the lake has shrunk by about 20,000 acres; the cui-uiis classified as an en-
dangered species, and the Lahotan cut-throat is classified as threatened. Nevada, 463 at
114-15; Truckee-Carson, 649 F.2d at 1290, 1294.
18. Non-Indian interests that depend upon the Truckee River for water include the
residents of Reno, Nevada, the Newlands Irrigation Project, which diverts about 200,000
acre-feet of water per year from the river, and the Stillwater Wildlife Refuge, which
depends upon return flows from the Newlands project for its water. G.A.O. REPORT,
supra note 7, at 36.
19. Tribal members testifed that the Pyramid Lake fishery contributed approxi-
mately $100,000 per year to the income of the tribe and employed forty Indians on a full-
time basis. Id.
20. Nevada, 463 U.S. at 118.
21. Id. at 119-20.
22. Truckee-Carson, 649 F.2d at 1289.
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these parties had been represented by the government in the
earlier Orr Ditch litigation, the court found that their interests
were not adverse and that they were not bound by the litigation.23
The Supreme Court reversed this section of the circuit court's
opinion, holding that res judicata barred any changes in fixed
water appropriations. The Court based its holding upon two ma-
jor premises: First, traditional adversity requirements do not
apply to water right adjudications because all parties to a water
rights adjudication are sufficiently adverse to bind themselves
and their successors by the ensuing decree. 24 Second, the tradi-
tional fiduciary duty of the United States toward the Indians is
weakened where the government is charged with conflicting re-
sponsibilities by Congress.25
The "traditional fiduciary duty" to which the Court referred
originated in two early Supreme Court opinions written by Chief
Justice John Marshall. In these decisions, Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia2 6  and Worcester v. Georgia,27  Justice Marshall
characterized the relationship between the Indians and the
government as that of a ward to its guardian. 28 The courts subse-
quently elevated Marshall's guardianship characterization into a
source of broad federal power to regulate Indian affairs. 29 In re-
cent years, however, the Indians have successfully argued in a
number of cases that this plenary power gives rise to attendant
responsibilities on the part of the government.3 0 The United
States, the Court wrote in 1942, "has charged itself with moral
23. Id. at 1309-11.
24. Nevada, 463 U.S. at 136-40.
25. Id. at 142.
26. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
27. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
28. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 26; Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 551.
29. Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians,
27 STAN. L. REv. 1213, 1223 (1975).
30. See, e.g., Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 479 F. Supp. 536
(D.N.M. 1979) (government liable for breach of fiduciary duty in mismanagement of oil
and gas lease); Edwardson v. Morton, 369 F. Supp. 1359 (D.D.C. 1973) (Alaska natives
stated claim for breach of trust against federal officials who allowed oil companies to
trespass on native lands); Manchester Band of Pomo Indians, Inc. v. United States, 363
F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (federal government ordered to manage trust funds
prudently); Coast Indian Community v. United States, 550 F.2d 639 (Ct. Cl. 1977)
(government liable for granting county right of way over Indian land at far below its
market value); Navajo Tribe v. United States, 364 F.2d 320 (Ct. Cl. 1966) (government
liable for mismanagement of helium lease). See also infra notes 76-85 and accompanying
text.
[Vol. 13
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obligation of the highest responsibility and trust. ' 31 The Court
further states that "the most exacting fiduciary standards"
should be applied to determine the government's adherence to its
responsibilities under the trust relationship. 32 Although its viabil-
ity has recently been called into question,3 3 the Indian trust doc-
trine has reemerged as a continuing source of federal responsibil-
ity toward the Indians .3
This note will briefly trace the development of the Winters doc-
trine and the trust relationship. Nevada will then be examined to
observe the interaction of these doctrines. Analysis of the Nevada
decision will suggest that the Court unnecessarily weakened the
government's trust responsibilities where the United States
represents both Indian and non-Indian interests. Finally, the im-
plications of the Court's decision in Nevada for both Indian
water issues and breach of trust claims will be discussed.
Indian Reserved Water Rights: The Winters Doctrine
The reserved water rights doctrine was first applied by the
Supreme Court in 1908 in Winters v. United States. 5 The govern-
ment sued to prevent a number of private parties from diverting
the waters of the Milk River in Montana upstream from the Fort
Belknap Indian Reservation, thereby impeding water flowing to
the reservation. Although large areas of the reservation were
cultivated or used for pasture, these uses depended on irrigation
water because the reservation land was arid.36 The non-Indian
users emphasized that they had put the waters of the Milk River
to beneficial use well before the Indians and therefore claimed
that their prior appropriation must be recognized under the laws
and customs of Montana." Furthermore, the non-Indian users
argued that they would have to abandon this land if deprived of
31. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942). See infra notes
77-80 and accompanying text.
32. Seminole Nation, 316 U.S. at 296-97.
33. United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell I), 445 U.S. 535 (1980), reh. denied, 446 U.S.
992. See generally, Newton, Enforcing the Federal-Indian Trust Relationship After Mit-
chell, 31 CATH. U.L. REv. 635 (1982).
34. See United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell 11), 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
35. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
36. Id. at 566-67. The Indians of the Fort Belknap Reservation, with the aid and en-
couragement of the government, had irrigated some 30,000 acres of land in order to raise
grain, grass, and vegetables; it was alleged that all of the'waters of the Milk River were
necessary to fulfill these and other purposes of the reservation. Id.
37. Id. at 568-69.
No. I I
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the water because it could not be successfully cultivated without
diversions from the Milk River." To resolve the Winters dispute,
the Court focused on an 1888 agreement in which the tribes re-
linquished a large tract of land that Congress had set aside for
them in 187439 in exchange for the creation of the present-day
Fort Belknap Reservation.40 Justice McKenna, writing for the
majority,4' noted that the government's purpose in establishing
the reservation was to enable the Indians to convert from a
nomadic way of life to a "pastoral and civilized" existence.' 2
Because the lands reserved were "arid and, without irrigation,
were practically valueless," this purpose could not be achieved
without a simultaneous reservation of water sufficient to enable
such use.4"
Much of the controversy surrounding Indian reserved rights
stems from the fact that the Winters Court set no standard by
which the reserved water right could be quantified." In Conrad
Investment Co. v. United States,"5 decided shortly after Winters,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was presented with an almost
identical fact situation involving the arid Blackfoot Reservation
in Montana, which requires irrigation water for agricultural
uses.' 6 The court held that, under the Winters decision, the
Blackfoot Tribe held a "paramount right" to use the disputed
waters of a creek for purposes of "irrigation and stock raising
and domestic and other useful purposes." 7 The court found that
the Winters right encompassed not only the water needed for cur-
rent uses, but future needs as well.' 8 Several other lower court
decisions dealt with the quantification of water rights, but no
definitive standard was adopted.' 9 As a result, water users with a
38. Id. at 569.
39. Act of Apr. 15, 1874, ch. 96, 18 Stat. 28.
40. Act of May 1, 1888, ch. 213, 25 Stat. 113.
41. Justice Brewer was the lone dissenter. See 207 U.S. at 578.
42. Id. at 576.
43. Id. at 576-77.
44. Although the Supreme Court in Winters did not articulate a standard by which
the reserved water right should be measured, the lower courts spoke of "sufficient waters
of the Milk River . . . to insure to the Indians the means wherewith to irrigate their
farms." 143 F. 740, 746 (9th Cir. 1906).
45. 161 F. 829 (9th Cir. 1908).
46. Id. at 830-31.
47. Id. at 831.
48. Id. at 832.
49. Two early Idaho cases held that the quantity of water reserved for the Indians
was that amount needed to irrigate all the reservation lands susceptible of irrigation.
[Vol. 13
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later priority date than Indian appropriators could not be certain
whether future Indian water needs would displace their uses.-"
In its 1963 decision in Arizona v. California,' the Supreme
Court attempted to resolve this uncertainty by holding that the
quantity of reserved water was that amount needed to irrigate all
of the practicably irrigable acreage within the Indian
reservation. 2 Because it determined that this amount would
satisfy both the present and future needs of the Indians, the
Court concluded that this was "the only feasible and fair way by
which reserved water for the reservations can be measured." '53
The Court went on to set fixed appropriations for the tribal water
claimants represented by the government in this litigation, based
on the amount of irrigable acreage within their reservations." '
In a postscript to this decision, the tribes represented by the
government in the original Arizona decision (Arizona I) sought to
intervene in 1977 in order to petition the Court to reopen the
decree." The tribes, joined by the government, maintained that
the amount of practicably irrigable acres within the reservations
had been underestimated, and, as a result, they were not awarded
all of the water to which they were entitled.5 6 In Arizona II, a
five-Justice majority,5" emphasizing that the irrigable acreage
standard was selected in order to provide a fixed and certain
allotment, rested on the principles of finality in refusing to
reopen the decree. 8
Skeem v. United States, 273 F. 93 (9th Cir. 1921); United States v. Hibner, 27 F.2d 909
(D. Idaho 1928). In United States v. Ahtanum Irrig. Dist., 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956),
the court rejected an argument that the reserved right should be limited to an amount the
Indians could put to beneficial use within a reasonable period of time, stating that the
right was intended for future as well as present uses. Id. at 326. But see United States v.
Walker River Irrig. Dist., 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939) (Indians' experience over past
eighty years held to be an indication of their needs); Tweedy v. Texas Co., 286 F. Supp.
383, 385 (D. Mont. 1968) ("need and use are prerequisite to any water rights on Indian
reservations").
50. Riley, supra note 2, at I, col. 3.
51. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
52. Id. at 600.
53. id. at 601.
54. Id. at 596, 601.
55. Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983).
56. Id. at 628.
57. Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and
O'Connor, wrote the majority opinion. Justice Brennan, concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part, was joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens. Justice Marshall took no part
in the consideration or decision of this case.
58. Arizona I, 460 U.S. at 628.
No. 1]
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The Federal-Indian Trust Relationship
The federal Indian trust doctrine evolved gradually from dicta
in two early opinions by Chief Justice John Marshall. In the first
case, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,5 9 the Cherokee Tribe sought
to invoke the Court's original jurisdiction in order to enjoin en-
forcement of Georgia laws giving the state jurisdiction over peo-
ple residing on the Indian lands. 60 In concluding that the tribe
was not a foreign state under the Constitution, and thus did not
come within the Court's original jurisdiction,6' Justice Marshall
described the Indian tribes as "domestic dependent nations. ' 62
They were, Justice Marshall continued, "in a state of pupilage.
Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his
guardian."63
The Supreme Court reiterated this view of the relationship be-
tween the tribal Indians and the federal government in Worcester
v. Georgia." In striking down the Georgia statutes it had refused
to consider in Cherokee Nation, the Court cited the dependent
status of the Indian tribe as a separate nation, "claiming and
receiving the protection of one more powerful. ' 65 The Chief
Justice went on to emphasize that the tribal right to all the lands
within their reservations "is not only acknowledged, but
guaranteed by the United States." ' 66 Justice Marshall's statements
of the federal trusteeship over Indian affairs sprang not from the
Constitution or judicial precedent but from his own conscience
and moral principles. 67 As a result, the trust relationship as artic-
ulated by Chief Justice Marshall was ambiguous in scope; yet his
statements became the foundation upon which the current Indian
trust doctrine was constructed.6 8
The trust relationship, as envisioned by Justice Marshall, was
subsequently seized upon as a source of independent federal
power over Indian affairs. In United States v. Kagama,69 and
59. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
60. Id. at 1-14.
61. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, dl. 2.
62. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
63. Id.
64. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
65. Id. at 555.
66. Id. at 557.
67. Note, Rethinking the Trust Doctrine in Federal Indian Law, 98 HARV. L. REV.
422, 424-25 (1984).
68. Id.
69. 118 U.S. 375 (i886.
[Vol. 13
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Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock," the Supreme Court emphasized the
powers of the United States as guardian, rather than its concomi-
tant responsibilities toward its Indian wards. In Kagama the
Court considered the constitutionality of the Major Crimes Act,7'
enacted in order to extend federal criminal authority to the In-
dian reservations. Conceding the law could not be supported by
the commerce clause,72 the Court held that Congress' power to
enact the law arose from its duty to protect the Indians, which in
turn was derived from the tribes' "very weakness and
helplessness."" The Lone Wolf decision built upon Kagama,
producing perhaps the most expansive statement of congressional
power over the Indians. Lone Wo/f involved a challenge to a con-
gressional statute that authorized allotment of tribal lands to in-
dividual Indians and the sale of unallotted lands to non-Indians,
in violation of an 1887 treaty. 7 In upholding the power of Con-
gress unilaterally to abrogate or modify an Indian treaty, the
Court stated that "[p]lenary power over tribal relations of the In-
dians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the
power has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be
controlled by the judicial department of the government. 7
Justice Marshall's guardianship principle had thus evolved into a
source of expansive federal power to regulate Indian affairs.
If the original trust doctrine had become a sword by which the
government exerted its power over the Indians, a developing line
of Supreme Court decisions proved that this sword had two
edges. As early as 1919, the courts began using the trust respon-
sibility in enforcing limitations on the manner in which the
government carried out its regulation of Indian affairs. 6 The
clearest expression of the scope of the federal obligation came in
Seminole Nation v. United States.77 This decision arose out of an
action by the tribe against the government for mismanagement of
certain trust funds under the provisions of an 1866 treaty.78
70. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
71. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1982).
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
73. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384.
74. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 561-62.
75. The Lone Wolf doctrine has been made somewhat more benign by subsequent
case law limiting the power of Congress to abrogate treaties by the fifth amendment doc-
trine of just compensation. See Chambers, supra note 29, at 1229.
76. See Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110 (1919). See generally Chambers,
supra note 29, at 1230-34.
77. 316 U.S. 286 (1942).
78. Id. at 286.
No. 1]
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Specifically, the tribe claimed that the government had breached
its trust relationship by disbursing Indian funds to the Seminole
General Council, which, the petitioners alleged, was defrauding
the individual members of the Seminole Nation. 9 In remanding
this issue to the Court of Claims, the Court focused on the
"distinctive obligation of trust" placed upon the government in
its dealings with the Indians. The Court stressed that the govern-
ment had charged itself with moral obligations of the highest
"responsibility and trust," which should be judged by "the most
exacting fiduciary standards." 8
In Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton,8' the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia applied the private
fiduciary standard of Seminole Nation to stem the decline of the
Pyramid Lake fishery, the same problem that ultimately promp-
ted the Nevada litigation. In Pyramid Lake, the Paiute Indians
successfully invoked the trust doctrine to restrain the government
from diverting unappropriated waters of the Truckee River and
thereby speeding the destructive lowering of Pyramid Lake.2
Previously, the Secretary of the Interior had divided the unap-
propriated water of the Truckee River between the Truckee-
Carson Irrigation District and the Pyramid Lake Tribe. 3 The
district court held that, in order to uphold his fiduciary duty as
outlined in Seminole Nation, "the Secretary must insure, to the
extent of his power, that all water not obligated by court decree
or contract with the District goes to Pyramid Lake."8 4 By failing
to do so, the court found that the Secretary had deprived the
tribe of water without any legal justification. 5
In Pyramid Lake, the Paiute Indians were successful in using
the trust relationship to obtain increased rights to unappropriated
water and thereby help forestall the gradual lowering of the
lake.8 6 In Nevada, the tribe sought to enlarge its reserved water
appropriation in order to obtain the remaining water needed to
preserve the lake.8 7 Although this case involved a previously ad-
judicated appropriation, the tribe again alleged that the govern-
79. Id. at 296.
80. Id. at 296-97.
81. 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973).
82. Id. at 258. See supra notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
83. Pyramid Lake, 354 F. Supp. at 255-56.
84. Id. at 256.
85. Id. at 257.
86. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 13
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol13/iss1/4
No. 1] NOTES
ment had failed in its trust obligations by not claiming sufficient
Winters rights in its earlier representation of the tribe."8
Nevada v. United States: The Supreme Court
Narrows the Trust Relationship
In Nevada v. United States, the Supreme Court denied the
Paiute Indians' request for enough reserved water to maintain the
viability of Pyramid Lake and the Truckee River as fish-spawning
grounds. The Court's unanimous decision agreed with the Ninth
Circuit that the cause of action raised by the Indians in Nevada
was the same as that asserted previously in Orr Ditch and was
therefore precluded by res judicata."1 Because the government
had represented both the Indians and the irrigation district in the
prior litigation, however, the lower court determined that these
parties were not bound by Orr Ditch because their interests had
not been adverse.90 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court,9'
disagreed with the Ninth Circuit on this issue, holding that all
parties, 92 and even nonparties such as subsequent appropriators,
were bound by the Orr Ditch decree. 93
The Court began its analysis9" by considering whether the same
cause of action was applied in both Orr Ditch and Nevada." In
concluding that the government intended to litigate the entire
88. Truckee-Carson, 649 F.2d at 1295. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564
(1908).
89. Nevada, 463 U.S. at 134.
90. Truckee-Carson, 649 F.2d at 1309-11.
91. Justice Brennan filed a brief concurring opinion. 463 U.S. at 144. See infra notes
119-123 and accompanying text.
92. Nevada, 463 U.S. at 135-44.
93. Id. at 144.
94. The government initially argued that it should be permitted to reallocate the
water decreed in Orr Ditch from reclamation project uses to reservation uses because it
had represented both parties in the earlier adjudication. Justice Rehnquist cited Nebraska
v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945), and Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82 (1937), which indicated
that the beneficial ownership of water rights in irrigation projects constructed under the
Reclamation Act of 1902 resided in the individual landowners rather than the United
States. The Court therefore dismissed the government's reallocation arguments, stating
that:
The Government is completely mistaken if it believes that the water rights confirmed
to it by the Orr Ditch decree in 1944 for use in irrigating lands within the Newlands
Reclamation Project were like so many bushels of wheat, to be bartered, sold, or
shifted about as the Government might see fit.
Nevada, 463 U.S. at 126.
95. Nevada, 463 U.S. at 130.
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reserved right for the Indians in Orr Ditch, the Court cited the
preclusive language of the decree itself,96 as well as the complaints
in both proceedings. Although the Nevada complaint emphasized
the water needed to preserve the fishery,97 while the Orr Ditch
litigation focused more on agricultural and domestic needs," the
Court stated that each use was embraced within the same reserved
right. 99 Having determined that the identical cause of action was
raised in both proceedings, the Court went on to consider
whether all of the parties were bound by the earlier decree.' 0
The Court easily found that both the government and the tribe
were parties to Orr Ditch. In holding that the tribe was a party,
the Court reaffirmed the principle that once the United States has
litigated on behalf of a tribe, the Indians cannot relitigate on
their own behalf.'01 The Court next considered whether the
Truckee-Carson Irrigation District could use the decree against
96. The decree provided in part that "each of (the parties] is hereby forever enjoined
and restrained from asserting or claiming any rights in or to the waters of the Truckee
River or its tributaries." Id. at 132.
97. The Nevada complaint provided in part that:
Members of the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians ... have relied upon water
from the Truckee River for irrigation, for domestic uses, for maintenance of the lower
segment of the Truckee River as a natural spawning ground for lake fish and for
maintenance of the lake as a viable fishery.
Id. at 133-34.
98. In the Orr Ditch complaint, the government focused on "protecting [the) Indians
and their descendants in their homes, fields, pastures, fishing, and their use of said lands
and waters." Quoted in Nevada, 463 U.S. at 133. Although the Court left unanswered the
question of whether adjudication of Indian reserved water rights can be split according to
use, it agreed with the lower court that the government had not done so in this case. Id. at
134, n.13. In the future, however, tribes that have not yet litigated their Winters rights
may make several different Winters claims based on different uses of the reserved water,
thereby enabling those tribes to expand their reserved right over time.
99. Id. Regardless of whether Justice Rehnquist was correct in finding that a fishery
right had been asserted on behalf of the Indians in Orr Ditch, it is clear that the final Orr
Ditch decree awarded only irrigation water to the Indians and did not encompass a fishery
water right. Truckee-Carson, 649 F.2d at 1290-95. See also supra note 13.
100. Nevada, 463 U.S. at 134-35.
101. "[I]t could not ... be tolerated that, after the United States on behalf of its
wards had invoked the jurisdiction of its courts. . . these wards should themselves be per-
mitted to relitigate the question." Id. at 135 (quoting Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S.
413, 446 (1912)). Although this rule has not been strictly adhered to where the interests of
the representative parties conflicted with those of persons represented, see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 42(d) (1982). See also Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 44
(1940), where Justice Rehnquist chose to carve out an exception to this exception where
the United States is representing Indian parties whose interests conflict with its own. See
infra notes 109-118 and accompanying text.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol13/iss1/4
NOTES
the tribe. The crux of the Supreme Court's difference with the
court of appeals was the significance of the fact that both were
represented by the same government attorneys.' 2 The reduced
emphasis that the Supreme Court placed upon the requirement of
adversity was rooted in the very nature of the litigation. Because
of the interdependent nature of water rights, the Court stated, all
water users must be bound in all combinations in an adjudication
of those rights in order that stability may be achieved. 03 Adver-
sity of the parties is thus of little consequence in the specialized
field of western water adjudications.' 0 4
The heightened finality interest in water adjudications is
underscored by the Court's holding that nonparties such as subse-
quent appropriators of the Truckee River could also rely on the
Orr Ditch decree.'0 5 Although the requirement of mutuality is a
part of the doctrine of res judicata,'16 the Court agreed with the
Ninth Circuit that an exception was merited for water adjudica-
tions, which are in the nature of in rein proceedings.' 07 Without
such an exception, the Court noted, it would be impossible to
quantify finally a reserved water right.'0 8
Having concluded that once the United States has litigated a
reservation's reserved water rights, a tribe cannot relitigate on the
basis of evidence that the award was deficient, the Court con-
sidered whether the quality of the government's representation
could change this result. Upon a thorough consideration of the
record,' 9 the court of appeals, citing the Restatement (Second)
of Judgments, had determined that the government had com-
promised its duty of undivided loyalty to the tribes."10 Although
the Court stated that "a strict adversity requirement does not
102. Nevada, 463 U.S. at 139.
103. Id. at 140.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 144.
106. The Court recognizes that mutuality has been largely abandoned in cases involv-
ing collateral estoppel, see, e.g., Parkland Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), but
finds that, with certain exceptions, it remains a part of res judicata. Id., citing 18 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4464, at 586-88.
(1981 & Supp. 1985).
107. The res judicata effect of an equitable in personamn action would normally be
limited to the parties and their privies, thus not binding subsequent water appropriators.
Truckee-Carson, 649 F.2d at 1308.
108. Nevada, 463 U.S. at 144.
109. Truckee-Carson, 649 F.2d at 1290-94.
110. Id. at 1309.
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necessarily fit the realities of water adjudications,""II it neverthe-
less concluded that the government's compromised role compelled
a showing of strict adversity between the tribe and the irrigation
district.1' 
2
The Supreme Court, however, took issue with the lower court's
use of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments in evaluating the
government's performance of its trust duties. While acknowledg-
ing the principle enunciated in Seminole Nation, that "the United
States undoubtedly owes a strong fiduciary duty to its Indian
wards, '""I3 Justice Rehnquist proceeded to carve out an exception
to this responsibility where Congress has imposed conflicting
duties on the Secretary of the Interior."' In this situation, the
Court stated, "the Government cannot follow the fastidious stan-
dards of a private fiduciary. "I Justice Rehnquist conceded that
where a relationship is only between the government and a tribe,
the private fiduciary analogy may be controlling."I6 But this can-
not be the case, he wrote, where Congress has imposed a duty to
obtain water rights for a federal irrigation project upon the
United States in addition to its duties to represent Indian
tribes." 7 By emphasizing the government's regulatory authority
over Indian affairs, rather than its concomitant responsibilities,
Justice Rehnquist's reasoning avoids the fiduciary edge of the
trust sword and harkens back to the plenary power edge."'
It is this feature of Justice Rehnquist's opinion that Justice
Brennan objected to in his short concurrence.' While agreeing
that the tribe was bound under the prior decree, Justice Brennan
argued that the Indians must still have a remedy in cases in which
the United States breaches its trust duties through inadequate
representation.' 20 The non-Indian interests at stake in Nevada,
Justice Brennan reasoned, should only be protected on the
understanding that the Paiute Indians could sue the United
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1310.
113. Nevada, 463 U.S. at 142.
114. Id. at 128, 142.
115. Id. at 128.
116. Id. at 142.
117. Id.
118. Id. (quoting Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 444-45 (1912) ("It is a
representation which traces its source to the plenary control of Congress in legislating for
the protection of the Indians under its care.")).
119. Nevada, 463 U.S. at 145-46.
120. Id.
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States. 21' The concurrence recognized that because there was not
enough water to satisfy the needs of all the parties to this litiga-
tion, some interests, such as those of the Paiute Indians here,
must suffer. 2 Yet, where such "loss, destruction, and profound
disappointment" could have been avoided, Brennan wrote, the
law should provide appropriate compensation. '23
Implications of the Nevada Decision
In Nevada v. United States, the Supreme Court has once again
demonstrated its unwillingness to reconsider an appropriation of
water that has already been fixed through a prior court decree. In
Nevada the Court unanimously applied the doctrine of res
judicata to bar the Indians from relitigating their reserved
right. 12 4 In Arizona v. California, decided only weeks before
Nevada,"'2 the Court had relied upon the principles of finality
underlying the doctrine of res judicata to achieve the same result
in a situation where the doctrine was inapplicable. 21 It is appar-
ent, therefore, that tribes whose reserved water rights have
already been litigated are not likely to see their appropriation
enlarged. In both Arizona and Nevada, there is ample evidence
that the tribes did not receive a reserved water right adequate to
fulfill the purposes for which the reservation was established.' 27
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. Justice Rehnquist noted that the tribe had already sued the government
before the Indian Claims Commission for damage to the Pyramid Lake fishery suffered
as a result of the tribe's receipt of less water for the fishery than it was entitled to. The
Commission found the government liable for damage to the fishery, Northern Paiute Na-
tion v. United States, 30 Ind. Cl. Comm. 210 (1973), and subsequently approved a com-
promise settlement of eight million dollars in the tribe's favor. Pyramid Lake Paiute
Tribe v. United States, 36 Ind. Cl. Comm. 256 (1975). See Nevada, 463 U.S. at 135 n.14.
124. Nevada, 463 U.S. at IIf.
125. Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 693 (1983). See also supra notes 55-58 and ac-
companying text.
126. Arizona, 460 U.S. at 609-29. Although the Indians' reserved water right had
previously been litigated and fixed by decree in Arizona I, res judicata did not control the
outcome of the Arizona II decision. Because the Arizona dispute arose under the Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction, see U.S. CONsT. art. Ill, § 2, with a decree that included a
provision for the retention of jurisdiction for the purposes of modification, Arizona I,
376 U.S. at 353, the majority acknowledged that it had the power to reopen the matter.
Arizona II, 460 U.S. at 618.
127. A newspaper reported that the five tribes involved in the Arizona litigation
received approximately 22 percent less water than they were entitled to. Barbash, Too
Late to Erase U.S. Error in Indian Pact, Court Holds, Wash. Post., Mar. 31, 1983, at Al,
col. 4. A special master appointed in Arizona found that at least 18,500 acres of irrigable
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These cases do not necessarily restrict the breadth of the Winters
doctrine, however. The doctrine itself remains intact; in fact, the
Court reaffirmed the controversial irrigable acreage standard of
quantification in Arizona.'28 Moreover, in Nevada it refused to
rule out the possibility that reserved water for different uses (i.e.,
agricultural versus fishery uses) could be litigated in different pro-
ceedings. 129 Tribes whose reserved water rights have not yet been
fixed by court decree will therefore not be adversely affected by
the Court's emphasis on the sanctity of finally determined water
rights.' 30
The Nevada decision has weakened the federal Indian trust,
however, by effectively severing water adjudication from the
government's trust responsibilities.' 3' Because of the pervasive
federal involvement in the development of western water pro-
jects, the United States will nearly always be in a position of in-
herent conflict when it seeks to litigate a reserved right on behalf
of an Indian tribe.' 32 Where Congress has charged the govern-
ment with representing not only the Indian tribe but also a con-
flicting public interest, Justice Rehnquist held that the private
fiduciary standards of Seminole Nation should not be applied to
evaluate its conduct.' 3 The Ninth Circuit's decision that the In-
dians and the irrigation district were not adverse parties was
bolstered by, but by no means rested on, the court's view that the
land were overlooked and thus would have supported an award of additional water rights
had they been identified in 1963. Arizona II, 460 U.S. at 644. In Nevada, the Paiute In-
dians were awarded only enough water to irrigate 5,875 acres of some 20,000 irrigable
acres thought to be within the reservation boundaries. See supra note 13.
128. Arizona 1, 373 U.S. at 600-01.
129. Nevada, 463 U.S. at 135 n.13. See also supra note 98.
130. "[M]ost Indian water rights have never been quantified." DuMars & Ingram,
Congressional Quantification of Indian Reserved Water Rights: A Definitive Solution or
a Mirage?, 20 NAT. REs. J. 17 (1980). Decisions such as those in Arizona and Nevada
may therefore have some beneficial effect in encouraging Indians to be zealous advocates
of their own interests in water rights litigation.
131. See supra notes 113-118 and accompanying text.
132. Commentators have noted that Indian water resources were largely ignored
"[wihile massive federal financial and other resources were committed to the development
of water resources on non-Indian lands in the West." DuMars & Ingram, supra note 130,
at 42. See also Price & Weatherford, Indian Water Rights in Theory and Practice: Navajo
Experience in the Colorado River Basin, 40 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97, 131 (1976) ("The
stark truth of the matter is that, beginning at the turn of the century, the offices and
powers of the national government were marshalled to plan, construct, and finance non-
Indian agricultural development in the West, and nothing comparable was done for the
Native American.").
133. Nevada, 463 U.S. at 143. See also supra notes 113-118 and accompanying text.
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United States had failed to meet its trust duties."' A narrowing
of the trust responsibility was therefore not essential to a refuta-
tion of the lower court's reasoning.
Given the emphasis the Supreme Court places on maintaining
the certainty and stability embodied in water appropriations fixed
by court decree, it is apparent that the Paiute Indians would not
be permitted to reopen the Orr Ditch decree, no matter how
strong the evidence that the earlier representation had been com-
promised by an impermissible conflict of interest.' 3  Such
evidence could be used, however, to support an action for breach
of trust, enabling the tribe to gain compensation for its loss. 36
The breach of trust remedy would therefore allow the tribe to
recover its losses stemming from inadequate government
representation in Orr Ditch, while protecting the rights of inno-
cent third parties who had relied on the decree. 37
The Court's unwarranted and unnecessary narrowing of the
trust responsibility in Nevada may ultimately deprive Indians of
even this option in future actions in which the United States has
represented multiple interests. 3 This point may be demonstrated
by an exploration of the effect the Nevada decision could have on
several cases considered earlier. In Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v.
Morton,'39 the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia held that the Secretary of the Interior had violated his
trust duty by his allocation of unallotted water between the tribe
and the irrigation district.' 0 "In order to fulfill his fiduciary
duty," the court wrote, "the Secretary must insure ... that all
water not obligated by Court decree or contract with the District
134. See supra notes 109-112 and accompanying text.
135. In both Arizona If and Nevada the Court stressed the heightened interest in cer-
tainty and finality that attaches to water rights adjudications. See supra notes 124-127 and
accompanying text.
136. As observed supra at note 123, the Paiute Indians obtained an award of eight
million dollars before the Indian Claims Commission 'on its claim for damages suffered
as the result of its not having received all of the water to which it was entitled under rights
reserved for the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation'." Truckee-Carson, 649 F.2d at 1295
(quoting Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. United States, 36 Ind. Cl. Comm. 256 (1975)). In
his concurrence, Justice Brennan stated that if "the United States actually causes harm
through a breach of its trust obligations the Indians should have a remedy against it."
Nevada, 463 U.S. at 144.
137. See infra notes 152-155 and accompanying text.
138. See infra notes 139-152 and accompanying text.
139. 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973). This case is discussed supra at notes 81-86 and
accompanying text.
140. Pyramid Lake, 354 F. Supp. at 258.
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goes to Pyramid Lake."' 4 ' Were this case to come into the courts
after Nevada, the private fiduciary standard of Seminole
Nation,' relied upon by the Pyramid Lake court, would no
longer be applicable because the Secretary was in a position that
required him to balance competing interests.' 3
The Supreme Court's decision in Nevada may also adversely
affect the five tribes whose water rights were adjudicated in
Arizona v. California.'" A special master appointed by the
Arizona Court concluded that the reserved water rights awarded
the tribes were deficient due to an error in the government's
calculation of the irrigable acreage within their reservations.' 5
Although the Court refused to reopen the decree to consider
whether the tribes' allotment should be enlarged,'" the tribes re-
tained the option to sue the government for inadequate represent-
ation of their interests.'4 7 The odds for success in such a suit have
been reduced, however, in the wake of Nevada. The Arizona case
began as a comprehensive adjudication of water rights within the
lower Colorado River basin.' 8 In the original proceedings, the
United States asserted claims to water for use on various federal
lands and projects as well as for the Indian reservations.'4 9 As in
Nevada, the Indians claimed that their water shortfall was due to
a conflict of interest on the part of the government.' 50 Because,
under Nevada, the trust duties of the United States are subject to
a lower standard in the conflict of interest situation, recovery of
adequate compensation in lieu of their full reward will thus be
more difficult for the tribes.' 5 '
Similarly, the Palute Indians now face increased hurdles to a
successful action for breach of trust. Because the government is
141. Id. at 256.
142. 316 U.S. 286 (1942). This case is discussed supra at notes 74-77 and accompany-
ing text.
143. Pyramid Lake, 354 F. Supp. at 255 ("The issue ... comes down to whether or
not the Secretary's resolution of conflicting demands . . . was effectuated arbitrarily
rather than in the sound exercise of discretion.").
144. 460 U.S. 605 (1983). This case is discussed supra at notes 55-58 and accompany-
ing text.
145. Arizona II, 460 U.S. at 613.
146. Id. at 609-29.
147. See Note, Arizona v. California: Finality as a Water Management Tool, 33
CATH. U.L. REV. 457, 475 (1984).
148. Arizona 1, 373 U.S. at 551.
149. Id. at 595.
150. Arizona 1I, 460 U.S. at 651-54.
151. See Nevada, 463 U.S. at 128, 143.
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held to a lower standard of trust, the Indians must make a corres-
pondingly stronger showing.' 52 Justice Rehnquist's opinion in
Nevada could arguably be interpreted as finding no fiduciary
duty where the government represents conflicting Indian and
non-Indian interests.'" The Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe is thus
unable to upset the Orr Ditch decree to obtain their full Winters
entitlement, nor is it likely to obtain damages in breach of trust.
In deciding Nevada, the Supreme Court has indicated that non-
Indian parties can rely on a prior adjudication of tribal reserved
water rights,'" while at the same time making it more difficult
for the tribes to obtain relief where such rights are not fully met
under a prior decree. 55  As this note has attempted to
demonstrate, these separate facets of the Court's opinion need
not be connected.' 56 Although innocent third parties should be
able to rely on the finality of water rights decrees, adversely af-
fected tribes should be able to obtain relief where government
representation has been inadequate. The Nevada decision should
therefore be restrictively applied by the lower courts in order that
Indian as well as non-Indian interests may be protected. Because
Justice Rehnquist reduced the government's trust duties in order
to enhance the finality of the Orr Ditch decree, Nevada should
apply only where a tribe seeks to reopen a prior decree. Where
tribal water rights are litigated in the first instance, however, the
private fiduciary standard should govern. A second way to
mitigate the impact of Nevada is by narrowly defining the conflict
of interest situation to which it applies. Courts should require an
explicit congressional mandate to the Secretary of the Interior to
balance competing interests as he sees fit. By so limiting the ap-
plication of Nevada, those tribes that have received less than their
full entitlement of water as a result of compromised advocacy by
the United States, may yet be protected.
152. Id.
153. Justice Rehnquist stated that "it is simply unrealistic to suggest that the Govern-
ment may not perform its obligation to represent Indian tribes in litigation when Congress
has obliged it to represent other interests as well." Nevada, 463 U.S. at 128. If the
Nevada decision were interpreted as imposing no duties in the conflict situation, jurisdic-
tion under the Tucker Act, Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (codified, as
amended, at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491 & 1505) would be called into question in the wake of Mit-
chell 11, 463 U.S. 206 (1983). The better argument, however, is that the private fiduciary
standard of Seminole Nation applies in the nonconflict situation, while a strong fiduciary
standard still governs in the conflict situation. See Nevada, 463 U.S. at 143.
154. See, e.g., Nevada, 463 U.S. at 139; Arizona If, 460 U.S. at 609-29.
155. See supra notes 138-151 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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Conclusion
In Nevada, the Supreme Court refused to allow the Pyramid
Lake Paiute Tribe to increase their reserved water allotment
under a 1944 decree, despite evidence that the prior award was
deficient. By its ruling, the Court protected the rights of innocent
third parties who had relied on the decree. The Court went fur-
ther than was necessary, however, in holding that the United
States cannot be held to the fiduciary standards of Seminole Na-
tion where it represents conflicting interests.
Nevada may ultimately mean that those tribes who have suf-
fered from inadequate government representation will not be able
to recover for their resultant injury where the government also
represented competing non-Indian interests. Ironically, the pro-
tection of the federal Indian trust is most needed where the
government simultaneously represents conflicting Indian and
non-Indian interests. Those tribes that cannot afford to protect
their own interests but must instead rely on the government may
lose forever valuable water rights through inadequate and con-
flicting representation. Nevada must therefore be restrictively ap-
plied so that such tribes may receive adequate compensation for
their losses.
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